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I. THE SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE JURISPRUDENCE 
It is commonplace to observe that judicial conservatives on the 
Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts, for the last several decades, have 
been cutting back on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.  
Perhaps.  But the evolution has hardly been all in one direction,1 nor can 
it always easily be mapped onto a conservative-liberal divide.2 
This Symposium, on the recent Supreme Court Term’s criminal 
procedure jurisprudence, illustrates these complexities.  Of the five 
“cases” discussed here,3 three come out in a “liberal” direction and two 
come out in a “conservative” direction.  Nor do the results merely stem 
from Justice Kennedy’s swing vote (though he was in the majority in all 
of these cases); one of the “liberal” cases was decided by a majority of 
seven Justices,4 and one of the “conservative” ones was decided by a 
majority of eight.5  Looking at these cases together is a good way of 
reminding us to be wary of simplistic generalizations about either the 
trajectory or the partisanship of the Supreme Court’s thinking on 
criminal procedure. 
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders,6 the Supreme Court 
upheld jail officials’ suspicionless “visual cavity” searches of detainees.  
Three of our authors provide their takes on this controversial case.  The 
Florence Court ruled, based on a balancing of privacy and security 
interests, that the searches were reasonable once people had arrived at  
the detention center and were going to be placed in the general  
population.  In his article, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into 
Fourth Amendment Equations: Strip Searches in Detention Facilities—
Atwater Strikes Again, William Schroeder argues that the ruling itself 
was correct, but that the problem is with the eleven-year-old case 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
 2.  See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (Scalia, J.); Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Scalia, J.); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (Scalia, 
J.); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (Scalia, J.); see also United States v. 
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1970 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 
554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 3.  Counting Maples and Martinez, see infra text accompanying notes 12–14, as one “case.”  
 4.  Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 5.  Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012). 
 6.  132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012).  
2
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Florence relied on, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,7 which established 
that people could be arrested even for trivial offenses.8  Schroeder 
suggests limiting Atwater to incorporate the seriousness of the offense 
into the standard for arrest.9  Wayne Logan likewise finds fault with 
Atwater, writing in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders: Police 
Power Takes a More Intrusive Turn, that “the stark constitutional reality 
remains that nothing in Florence necessitates that anything other than 
the intrusive techniques experienced by Albert Florence will be 
deployed in the nation’s jails and detention centers.”10  In Bright Lines, 
Black Bodies: The Florence Strip Search Case and its Dire 
Repercussions, Theresa Miller argues that Florence, with its one-size-
fits-all approach that ill-matches the diversity of jail populations, 
inappropriately privileges the administrative concerns of law 
enforcement officials and encourages overreaching by law enforcement, 
including immigration officials.11 
Florence was 5–4 and pitted conservatives against liberals.  But 
Giovanna Shay writes on a pair of cases that came out the other way—
Maples v. Thomas12 and Martinez v. Ryan,13 where a 7–2 majority (with 
only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting) expanded the circumstances 
under which ineffective assistance of counsel in state postconviction 
proceedings can excuse a procedural default at the federal habeas 
stage.14  In The New State Postconviction, Shay argues that these 
opinions, aside from being good in themselves, could also “have a 
salutary effect on the development of . . . federal constitutional criminal 
procedure.”15  After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 
federal habeas courts no longer give full review to state-court judgments  
of federal constitutional questions, and so state postconviction  
proceedings are the only stage where inmates’ constitutional claims can 
get “unfettered review.”  To the extent these decisions lead to the 
appointment of more qualified state postconviction counsel, the result 
could be not only better results for prisoners but also a more robust state 
 
 7.  532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 8.  See 46 AKRON L. REV. 331 (2013). 
 9.  Id.   
 10.  46 AKRON L. REV. 415, 431 (2013). 
 11.  46 AKRON L. REV. 433 (2013). 
 12.  132 S. Ct. 912 (2012). 
 13.  132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
 14.  Giovanna Shay has commented on my work before, see Giovanna Shay, One Market We 
Do Not Need, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 319 (2012) (commenting on Alexander Volokh, 
Prison Vouchers, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 779 (2012)), and now I’m returning the favor.  See also infra 
notes 52, 81 (me citing her some more). 
 15.  46 AKRON L. REV. 475, 474 (2013). 
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postconviction procedure. 
Other decisions, some of our authors argue, are a mixed bag.  In 
Developmental Detour: How the Minimalism of Miller v. Alabama Led 
the Court’s “Kids Are Different” Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Down a Blind Alley, Mary Berkheiser writes about Miller v. Alabama,16 
which struck down mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenders.17  On the one hand, Berkheiser hails the ruling as an 
“advance.”18  On the other hand, she finds it only a “small step” forward 
insofar as the decision does no more than ban mandatory sentences; life 
without parole for juvenile homicide offenders is still permitted as long 
as the jury gives the offenders individualized consideration and 
considers mitigating factors.19 And such individualized consideration, 
Berkheiser argues, is “no friend to youth.”20  How could the Supreme 
Court purport to rely on precedents like Roper v. Simmons21 and 
Graham v. Florida,22 and yet “veer [so] far from the principles of those 
cases”?23  Berkheiser lays the blame at the feet of the current brand of 
judicial conservatism in vogue on the Supreme Court: Chief Justice 
Roberts’s “judicial minimalism.”24  Of course Miller was a 5–4 decision 
in which Justice Kennedy sided with the liberals, so the blame belongs 
neither to conservatism in a narrow sense nor to Chief Justice Roberts 
specifically.  Rather, it is a more general minimalism that “all but the 
Court’s two most conservative jurists have embraced . . . in one form or 
another”25 that prevented the Court from taking the more ambitious step 
that Berkheiser would prefer—a holding that life without parole for 
juveniles is cruel and unusual in all cases. 
The rhetoric of judicial conservatism is also on display in  
Christopher Smith’s article, Brown v. Plata, the Roberts Court, and the  
Future of Conservative Perspectives on Rights Behind Bars. Smith 
discusses Brown v. Plata,26 where the Supreme Court, in a 5–4 liberal 
vs. conservative opinion, upheld a population limit that a lower court 
had imposed on the California prison system to remedy 
 
 16.  132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 17.  46 AKRON L. REV. 489 (2013). 
 18.  Id. at 490. 
 19.  Id. at 490–91. 
 20.  Id. at 490. 
 21.  543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 22.  130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 23.  Berkheiser, supra note 17, at 501. 
 24.  Id. at 515.  
 25.  Id.   
 26.  131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
4
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unconstitutionally overcrowded conditions.27  Smith takes the decision 
as an opportunity to explore the divergent rhetorical styles of two 
different kinds of judicial conservatives.  On the one hand, we have 
“doctrinaire, relatively extreme, [and] strident” conservatives such as 
Justices Thomas and Scalia who, in Smith’s view, have a limited 
influence on their colleagues: “The tone and choice of words in Scalia’s 
opinion seem[s] designed to bludgeon rather than persuade.”28  On the 
other hand, we have the more recently appointed conservatives, Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, who, with their softer-spoken style and 
emphasis on practical concerns, may represent a “more persuasive next 
generation.”29 
But first, let me begin this Symposium with a discussion of Minneci 
v. Pollard,30 where the Supreme Court, with only Justice Ginsburg 
dissenting, held that where a federal prisoner sues employees at a private 
federal prison for violations of the Eighth Amendment, he can’t get 
damages under the judicially created remedy of Bivens v. Six Unknown 
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics31 “where that conduct is 
of a kind that typically falls within the scope of traditional state tort 
law.”32  Minneci is somewhat harmful to federal inmate litigants in that 
it removes a potentially useful cause of action, and it may have been 
wrongly decided as a matter of Bivens doctrine.  However, I argue here 
that it’s probably not nearly as harmful as some have charged, once one 
takes into account how hard it is to sue public prisons and how relatively 
generous are the tort-law regimes that govern private prisons. 
II. THE POSSIBLE HARMLESSNESS OF MINNECI 
The constitutional damages remedy, first recognized by the  
Supreme Court in Justice Brennan’s opinion in Bivens in 1971, enjoyed  
nine years of expansion but has now experienced thirty-three years (and 
counting) of contraction.33  Justices Scalia and Thomas characterize 
Bivens as “a relic of the heady days in which [the Supreme] Court 
assumed common-law powers to create causes of action by 
 
 27.  Christopher E. Smith, Brown v. Plata, The Roberts Court, and the Future of Conservative 
Perspectives on Rights Behind Bars, 46 AKRON L. REV. 519 (2013). 
 28.  Id. at 539. 
 29.  Id. at 541. 
 30.  132 S. Ct. 617 (2012). 
 31.  403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 32.  Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 626. 
 33.  See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts: Constitutional Wrongs Without 
Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 26 (2007) (characterizing the 
Bivens doctrine as being “on life support with little prospect of recovery”). 
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constitutional implication,”34 and, as such, would limit Bivens and its 
expansive progeny “to the precise circumstances that they involved.”35  
Justices Scalia and Thomas don’t speak for the rest of the Court on this 
point, but there has consistently been a Supreme Court majority for 
limiting the Bivens remedy when there have been (even imperfect) 
alternative remedial schemes36 or (what a majority has seen as) special 
reasons counseling hesitation.37  And occasionally such contractions 
have been affirmatively harmful, leaving litigants with no remedy at all 
for injuries caused by unconstitutional acts.38 
Minneci v. Pollard expands the set of alternative remedial schemes 
that are sufficient to bar the Bivens action, so—at least on its surface—it 
seems like it belongs to this Bivens-contracting tradition.  But, as we’ll 
see, it’s a lot less threatening to civil rights claimants than it may seem 
to be at first glance.   
Richard Lee Pollard, a federal inmate at a prison run by Wackenhut 
Corrections Corp.,39 asserted a variety of claims against the 
corporation’s employees, including Margaret Minneci, Administrator of  
Health Services at the correctional facility in which he was housed.40  
Among other things, he claimed that in the course of transporting him to 
a medical clinic for treatment, they forced him to wear a jumpsuit and 
arm restraints that caused him excruciating pain.  Pollard also charged 
that they failed to follow clinic instructions to put his elbow in a splint, 
failed to provide physical therapy, deprived him of basic hygienic care, 
 
 34.  Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 626 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.) (quoting Corr. 
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 35.  Id.  
 36.  See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388–89 (1983) (civil-service review process). 
 37.  See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (military-related special factors). 
 38.  See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007); Tribe, supra note 33, at 25, 70; Natalie 
Banta, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts or Hard Bargaining?: How the Court’s Indecision in 
Wilkie v. Robbins Improperly Eviscerates the Bivens Action, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 119 (2008).  Tribe 
writes that, in Wilkie:  
[T]he [Supreme] Court . . . for the first time since Bivens . . . held, without any indication 
from Congress that it disfavored the application of a Bivens remedy in such 
circumstances, that a private citizen could not sue a government official for a 
constitutional violation, even in the absence of any alternative to such a suit that would 
operate to deter that kind of violation or at least redress it when deterrence failed. 
Tribe, supra note 33, at 70.  
 39.  Wackenhut Corrections Corp. is now called the GEO Group.  See Alexander Volokh, 
Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1229 
n.131 (2008). 
 40.  Pollard v. Wackenhut Corr. Corp., No. CV F 01 6078, 2006 WL 2661111, at *1 (E.D. 
Cal. Sept. 14, 2006) (misspelling Minneci’s name as “Minnici”). 
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and gave him insufficient medicine.41 
But this is within the core of what’s traditionally covered by state 
tort law.  As the Supreme Court wrote: 
Pollard’s claim . . . is a claim for physical or related emotional harm 
suffered as a result of aggravated instances of the kind of conduct that 
state tort law typically forbids.  That claim arose in California, where 
state tort law provides for ordinary negligence actions, for actions 
based upon “want of ordinary care or skill,” for actions for “negligent 
failure to diagnose or treat,” and for actions based upon the failure of 
one with a custodial duty to care for another to protect that other from 
“‘unreasonable risk of physical harm.’”42 
Moreover, state tort law is in many ways43 superior to constitutional 
tort litigation:44 most obviously, the negligence standard is far broader 
than the Eighth Amendment’s “deliberate indifference” standard,45 
though one could also add other considerations like the availability of 
respondeat superior liability.46 
So Bivens, the Court held, is unavailable here.  The idea that Bivens 
remedies can be limited when some alternative relief is available is 
nothing new; rather, it’s that this alternative relief needn’t have been 
contemplated by Congress and needn’t even be federal or uniform.  In 
this case, the alternative remedial scheme is state tort law, and so that’s 
what the prisoner is stuck with, even if it doesn’t overlap with the Bivens  
remedy in every particular.47 
Commentators have been quick to charge that Minneci “shut[s] the 
federal courthouse doors to inmates who suffer as a result of” shoddy 
private-prison practices,48 “create[s] new obstacles for civil rights 
plaintiffs,”49 “radically reduces the scope of Bivens relief,” allows the 
 
 41.  Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620–21 (2012). 
 42.  Id. at 624 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. §§ 1714(a), 1714.8(a) (West 2013); Giraldo v. 
Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 384 (App. 2008)). 
 43.  Though not all ways.  See infra text accompanying note 172.  
 44.  See John F. Preis, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
723, 726, 744 (2008). 
 45.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
 46.  Compare FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1993) (no Bivens remedy against the employer), 
and Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (extending Meyer to Bivens suits against 
private parties), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1958) (“A master is subject to 
liability for the torts of his servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”). 
 47.  Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 625. 
 48.  Minneci v. Pollard, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, http://www.afj.org/connect-with-the-
issues/the-corporate-court/minneci-v-pollard.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
 49.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Civil Rights Cases Will Face New Hurdles, 
ABAJOURNAL.COM (Feb. 1, 2012, 8:50 AM CST), http://www.abajournal.com/news/
7
Volokh: The Modest Effect of Minneci
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 1 - VOLOKH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:21 AM 
294 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:287 
federal government to extinguish the Bivens remedy through 
privatization, and makes the doctrine incoherent.50 But these fears are 
probably overblown: Bivens is only unavailable because the alternative 
remedial regime is actually pretty attractive. 
* * * 
To make sense of this, we need to discuss tort remedies and 
constitutional law together.  This isn’t a natural move for con-law 
scholars who don’t usually think in terms of state tort law when they 
think about litigation by inmates in prisons and jails.51  They might think 
of “‘court-order’ cases—litigation in which groups of inmate plaintiffs, 
represented by counsel, seek court-enforceable orders to govern some 
general set of prison or jail practices.”52  The most prominent recent 
example of this sort of litigation is Brown v. Plata,53 where the Supreme 
Court upheld a population limit for the California prison system to 
remedy widespread Eighth Amendment violations.  They would also 
think of cases brought by individual inmates seeking damages or 
accommodations—and within this category, they would probably 
primarily think of constitutional litigation.  There, what’s striking is the 
odd compartmentalization of the field—a compartmentalization that 
Minneci makes even more stark. 
The greatest doctrinal divide in constitutional damages litigation is 
between state and federal remedies. Inmates in state prisons can use 
§ 1983 to sue and collect damages from prison employees who have 
violated their constitutional rights.  These employees are “near[ly] 
universal[ly]” indemnified by their employer,54 so these lawsuits are 
 
article/chemerinsky_new_hurdles_for_civil_rights_cases.  
 50.  Alexander A. Reinert & Lumen N. Mulligan, Asking the First Question: Reframing 
Bivens After Minneci, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2042175. 
 51.  The inclusion of jails is essential when talking about litigation in the correctional context, 
since about a third of the inmate population is housed in jails, and jail inmates account for perhaps 
between 6% and 20% of total inmate litigation.  See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1579–82 & n.77 (2003).  Nonetheless, for simplicity, I’ll often use the 
shorthand “prisons” in what follows. 
 52.  Id. at 1561; see also Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of Corrections Litigation, 
142 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1993); Giovanna Shay, Ad Law Incarcerated, 14 BERK. J. CRIM. L. 329, 
332–35 (2009); sources cited in Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1561 n.16.  
 53.  131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). 
 54.  See Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1676 n.391 (noting that, though vicarious liability is 
unavailable under § 1983 and Bivens, “the typical arrangement, usually by statute, is that the 
correctional agency indemnifies its officers unless the act . . . was outside the ‘scope of 
employment’ or was intentional or malicious”); see also Cornelia Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: 
The Strange Results of Public Officials’ Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 78 & 
n.61 (1999); David Zaring, Three Models of Constitutional Torts, 2 J. TORT L. 3, at 10 (2008); 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss2/1
ARTICLE 1 - VOLOKH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:21 AM 
2013] THE MODEST EFFECT OF MINNECI 295 
against the government in all but name, with an overlay of individual 
defenses like qualified immunity.  Private prisons work just like public 
ones as far as §1983 liability is concerned,55 except that private prison 
employees lack qualified immunity56—so private prison inmates even 
(at least in this respect) get more favorable treatment by federal courts.57 
Federal inmates, on the other hand, look like state inmates’ poor 
cousins.  Not having a statute like § 1983 to cover constitutional torts—
the sins of federal agents weren’t on the minds on the post-Civil War 
Congressmen who passed the statute—federal inmates have to make do 
with the judge-made doctrine of Bivens.  Bivens and § 1983 are similar 
in terms of issues like indemnification58 and qualified immunity,59 but 
 
Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the 
Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 811 n.2, 850 & n.184 (2010).  Courts often 
ignore, as a legal matter, the possibility of such indemnification.  See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 486 (1994) (in the Bivens context); Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 363 (D.N.J. 2004) (in 
the Bivens context).  But see Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 409–11 (1997) (using the 
possibility of indemnification in the private sector as an argument against extending qualified 
immunity to private employees in § 1983 suits).  Note also that, in light of near-universal 
indemnification in the public sector, the Richardson argument just mentioned seems incorrect.  See 
Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional Torts, 
and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 805–09 (2007); see also Richardson, 521 U.S. at 420 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[C]ivil-rights liability is insurance is no less available to public entities than 
to private employers.”). 
 55.  The Supreme Court has never ruled that private prisons are state actors, though it has 
assumed as much, see Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413, and circuit courts have held this, mostly based 
on the “exclusive public function” theory.  See, e.g., Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th 
Cir. 1991); Rosborough v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 350 F.3d 459, 460–61 (5th Cir. 2003); Smith v. 
Cochran, 339 F.3d 1205, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 2003).  Cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54–57 (1988).  
This has certainly been right: state action is present when a private party exercises powers 
“traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,” Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 
(1974), and surely imprisonment fits within this category. (While the private sector has been 
involved in incarceration throughout American history, see, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State 
Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 450–55 (2005), the requirement that one be 
locked up has always, in the United States, come from the government.).  Thus, private prisons are 
subject to the full panoply of constitutional protections that apply in public prisons.  That public 
prisons are state actors is not only obvious but is also implied by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 
555–56 (1974).  Accordingly, § 1983 lawsuits against private prison employees are unproblematic. 
See also Volokh, supra note 14, at 813 & n.161; Alexander Volokh, The Constitutional Possibilities 
of Prison Vouchers, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 983, 1006–10, 1028 (2011). 
 56.  See Richardson, 521 U.S. 399. 
 57.  See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1880–82 
(2002) (Part III of the Developments article is my student note) [hereinafter Developments in the 
Law]. 
 58.  See supra note 54. 
 59.  See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 
244 (2009) (citing a Bivens case, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987), for a point 
about qualified immunity under § 1983); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 78 n.4 (2001) 
(citing a § 1983 case denying qualified immunity to private prison guards, Richardson v. McKnight, 
521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997), for the proposition that private prison guards would lack qualified 
9
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where they differ the most is in whether the remedy is available at all.60  
In principle, Bivens remedies, first devised in a Fourth Amendment 
context, are available for Fifth Amendment61 and Eighth Amendment62 
violations (since 1979 and 1980, respectively).  But the availability of 
adequate alternative relief has always been a reason for limiting the 
remedy’s availability; “of course,” the Court has said, “were Congress to 
create equally effective alternative remedies” for federal inmate victims 
of constitutional torts, “the need for damages relief might be obviated.”63  
The alternative remedies noted are usually federal ones,64 but state 
remedies have been relevant from the very beginning.65 
Contrast this with § 1983, where the availability of alternative relief 
under state law is mostly,66 though not entirely,67 irrelevant.  Alternative 
federal relief may bar a § 1983 action, but it seems as though Congress’s 
alternative scheme must, at a minimum, intend to displace § 1983, track 
the § 1983 remedy closely in terms of coverage, and provide relief 
against individuals.68  In some cases, too, sufficient post-deprivation 
 
immunity under Bivens). 
 60.  See also William N. Evans, Comment, Supervisory Liability After Iqbal: Decoupling 
Bivens from Section 1983, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2010) (arguing that supervisory liability 
should exist under § 1983 but not under Bivens). 
 61.  Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); see also Muhammad v. Carlson, 739 F.2d 122, 
123-25 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Davis in the prison context). 
 62.  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 63.  Davis, 442 U.S. at 248; Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–19. 
 64.  See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18–19 (looking into not just whether there was a federal remedy 
but whether “Congress has provided an alternative remedy which it explicitly declared to be a 
substitute for recovery directly under the Constitution and viewed as equally effective”) (emphasis 
added); Sarro v. Cornell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 (D.R.I. 2003) (“[S]tate law remedies 
cannot be construed as a manifestation of Congressional intent to preclude the application of 
Bivens.”); Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Sarro, 
248 F. Supp. 2d at 63), rev’d by an evenly divided en banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 65.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 
(1971); Davis, 442 U.S. at 245; Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 551 (2007).  But see Reinert & 
Mulligan, supra note 50, at 17–18 (arguing that the existence of state remedies is only relevant “if 
the Court concludes that Congress intended to rely upon state-law remedies as an alternative 
remedy”). 
 66.  See Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of L.A., 227 U.S. 278, 294–95 (1913); Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (“[T]he fact that 
Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the 
present suit in the federal court.”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974) (state judicial 
or administrative exhaustion not required); Preis, supra note 44, at 732, 734–38. 
 67.  See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172 (1985); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 326–27 (2005); Preis, 
supra note 44, at 732–33. 
 68.  See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009); James E. Pfander & 
David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 
117, 142–43 (2009). 
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relief may suffice to avoid violating the plaintiff’s constitutional rights in 
the first place.69  But generally, alternative relief is much more of a deal-
killer in Bivens-land than for § 1983 actions. 
The result in Minneci was thus always potentially in the air, but 
now we know for sure: Bivens is entirely unavailable for a whole class 
of claims.  But only for federal inmates, of course, for such is the nature 
of Bivens.  And only for inmates in private prisons, since, as we’ll see, 
only they can benefit from state tort-law remedies; federal public-prison 
inmates’ tort-law claims must be brought against the federal government 
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),70 and we know from 
Carlson v. Green71 that this alternative remedy is insufficient to preclude 
Bivens. 
The federal constitutional landscape for prisoner litigation (whether 
in state or federal courts) thus looks like the following matrix, with the 
lower right-hand corner looking strangely empty:72 
 
 Public prisons Private prisons 
State § 1983, no entity 
liability73 
§ 1983 (no qualified immunity),74 
typically no entity liability75 
Federal Bivens,76 no entity 
liability77 
no Bivens in areas covered by state 
tort law,78 no entity liability79 
 
 69.  See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128-30 (1990); Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 
68, at 145–46. 
 70.  See infra Part III.A. 
 71.  446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 72.  For a similar table, see Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1111 (10th Cir. 
2005) (Ebel, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d by an evenly divided en banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 
(10th Cir. 2006). 
 73.  Because of state sovereign immunity.  See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979).  
 74.  Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997). 
 75.  This is one difference between my table and Judge Ebel’s: Judge Ebel says that there is 
§ 1983 liability for a private prison, while I say there isn’t.  Judge Ebel cites Lugar v. Edmonson Oil 
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941–42 (1982), for the proposition that corporations can be liable under § 1983, 
but in Lugar the state action was exercised by the corporation itself, so there was no question of 
respondeat superior liability.  Lugar thus doesn’t speak to whether a private prison company can be 
sued on a purely respondeat superior theory.  As to that point, Richard Frankel explains that courts 
have used the doctrine of Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which 
limits respondeat superior liability for municipalities in § 1983 actions, to similarly limit respondeat 
superior liability for private employers; I thus write here that there typically isn’t entity liability.  
See Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 
(2009); see also Evans, supra note 60, at 1408. 
 76.  Carlson, 446 U.S. 14. 
 77.  FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
 78.  This is the new addition from Minneci. 
 79.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
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So much for federal constitutional litigation.  But what we don’t 
usually think about are the “good many suits, about which far less is 
known, brought under state law and non-civil rights federal causes of 
action.”80  On the federal level, we have administrative claims and 
lawsuits under the federal or state Administrative Procedure Acts, often 
“relating to discipline and other grievances, including those about lost 
and damaged property and workplace injuries.”81  And the little-studied 
area of state-court inmate litigation is also “an important piece of the 
litigation landscape: a very gross estimate might be that about a quarter 
of what prison and jail officials think of as inmate litigation is currently 
filed in state court.”82  The tort-law matrix looks quite different than the 
constitutional matrix above.  Instead, we have: 
 
 Public prisons Private prisons 
State lots of tort-law 
immunity doctrines 
(mostly) full exposure to state tort 
law83 Federal lots of FTCA 
exceptions to 
liability 
 
As with constitutional litigation, state-law tort litigation can take 
place in either state court or federal court (if the prisoner and the prison 
defendants are of diverse citizenship); FTCA litigation, though, must 
take place in federal court.84 
If you’re a litigant, the tort table above suggests that there are 
various reasons to prefer litigating as a private prisoner than as a public 
one.  In Part III, I’ll explain the many barriers to tort claims against both 
state and federal public prisons.  In Part IV, I’ll explain how many of 
 
 80.  Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1573. 
 81.  Id. at 1573 n.52 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 541.19; id. pt. 542; id. §§ 543.30–.32; 18 U.S.C. § 
4126(c)(4); Thompson v. U.S. Fed. Prison Indus., 492 F.2d 1082, 1084 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1974)).  The 
federal Bureau of Prisons and correctional departments in seventeen states are subject to their 
respective APAs, but twenty-eight states explicitly exempt prison rules from their APAs wholly or 
partially, and another half-dozen do so by judicial interpretation.  See Shay, supra note 52, at 344–
47; see also id. at 376–94 (collecting state regimes). 
 82.  Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1573 n.52 (doing a “not very satisfactory” back-of-the-
envelope calculation and also citing Dean J. Champion, Jail Inmate Litigation in the 1990s, in 
AMERICAN JAILS: PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 197, 211 (Joel A. Thompson & G. Larry Mays eds., 
1991)). 
 83.  On the state level, some tort claims are limited by state Prison Litigation Reform Acts.  
See infra Part V. 
 84.  See infra text accompanying notes 87–89. 
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these tort barriers fall away when you’re suing private prisons.  In Part 
V, I’ll note to what extent these conclusions may be changed by the 
existence of the federal and state Prison Litigation Reform Acts.  In Part 
VI, I’ll see what this tells us about Bivens doctrine as a whole.  Part VII 
concludes. 
III. TORTS AND PUBLIC PRISONS 
A. Suing Federal Prisons 
Suing public prisons on a tort theory is difficult, primarily due to 
sovereign immunity. 
The federal government has partially waived its sovereign 
immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which makes the 
federal government liable for tort claims “in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,”85 
incorporating the law of the place where the allegedly wrongful act 
occurred.86  The FTCA gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction  
over tort suits against federal employees acting within the scope of their 
employment.87  Once the Attorney General certifies that the employee 
was acting within the scope of his employment, the claim (if brought in a 
state court) is removed to a federal district court,88 and the United States 
is substituted as the defendant.89 
So far, so good for the tort claimant.  Indeed, in United States v. 
Muniz,90 the Supreme Court explicitly, and unanimously, held that the 
FTCA was available to federal prisoners.91  But any prison-based lawsuit 
against the federal government is likely to run into a few serious 
problems, chief among which are exceptions to the FTCA’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity—that is, no-liability (and, indeed, no-jurisdiction) 
rules.  These are features of the FTCA framework according to the 
Muniz Court, statutory protections for the government that prevent 
prisoner suits from “seriously handicap[ping] efficient government 
operations.”92  I’ll mention two of these exceptions here: the detained 
 
 85.  28 U.S.C. § 2674 (West 2013). 
 86.  Id. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2674. 
 87.  Id. § 1346(b)(1). 
 88.  Id. § 2679(d)(2). 
 89.  Id. § 2679(d)(1). 
 90.  374 U.S. 150 (1963).  
 91.  Id. at 150 (Justice White didn’t participate in the case).  
 92.  Id. at 163–64 (discussing the discretionary function and intentional tort exemptions, see 
infra text accompanying notes 97–110). 
13
Volokh: The Modest Effect of Minneci
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 1 - VOLOKH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:21 AM 
300 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:287 
property exception and the discretionary function exception.  
First, the FTCA doesn’t waive sovereign immunity if the claim 
arises “in respect of . . . the detention of . . . property by . . . any . . . law 
enforcement officer.”93  The term “law enforcement officer” includes 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) officers94 and the exception is interpreted 
broadly to include both negligent and intentional conduct.95  So, if, on 
being transferred from one federal prison to another, you find, as did the 
luckless Abdus-Shahid M.S. Ali, that the BOP has somehow misplaced 
your Qur’an and prayer rug, you’re out of luck.96 
Second, there’s the FTCA exception for claims “based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government”; sovereign immunity is retained even if 
the discretion is abused.97  This exception is limited to acts where some 
discretion is permitted (i.e., non-ministerial acts)98 and where the type of 
decision is “susceptible to policy analysis.”99 
Take, for instance, the case of Faustino Calderon, a federal prison 
inmate in Oxford, Wisconsin who was attacked by fellow inmate Luis 
Perez for informing on one of Perez’s relatives.100  Though Calderon had 
told four BOP officials of Perez’s threats, no one at the prison took any 
steps to protect him.101  But the BOP’s decision not to segregate 
Calderon and Perez was based on a consideration of various factors 
listed in BOP regulations, “balancing the need to provide inmate security 
with the rights of the inmates to circulate and socialize within the 
prison”;102 and so, Calderon lost his claim under the discretionary 
function exception.  Obviously, whether the BOP had considered the 
factors correctly or negligently, or whether the factors were even correct, 
played no role in the resolution of the case. 
The discretionary function can even preclude liability where it 
would otherwise be explicitly granted, as where a law enforcement 
 
 93.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (2006). 
 94.  Ali v. Fed. Bur. of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 216, 218–28 (2008). 
 95.  Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854 (1984). 
 96.  Ali, 552 U.S. at 216. 
 97.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).  The same subsection also retains sovereign immunity for 
“[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, 
in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid.”  Id. 
 98.  See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991); Berkovitz v. United States, 
486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988). 
 99.  Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325. 
 100.  Calderon v. United States, 123 F.3d 947, 948 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 949–51. 
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officer commits an intentional tort like battery.103  What if a battery by a 
law enforcement officer is also the result of an exercise of discretion?  
Does the law enforcement proviso to the assault-and-battery exception 
govern (in which case we would have liability), or is liability foreclosed 
by the discretionary function exemption?  The circuits differ: in the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits, the proviso governs and liability can attach,104 
while five other circuits—the Second, Third, Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits—have gone the other way.105   
Finally, the FTCA provides an additional handful of procedural 
hurdles.106  For instance, plaintiffs can’t get a jury trial,107 nor can they 
get pre-judgment interest or punitive damages.108 
B.  Suing State Prisons 
The FTCA is a waiver of the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity, so naturally it applies only to tort suits against the federal 
government or its employees or agencies.109  If, as a state inmate, you 
want to bring a tort suit against state prison employees, a state prison, or 
a state government, the sovereign immunity of the United States doesn’t 
come into play and so the foregoing FTCA-based limitations are 
irrelevant.  State sovereign immunity, though, is as great a bar here as 
federal immunity is for federal inmates.  In fact, “[a]s a general matter, 
state waivers of immunity are narrower than the federal 
government’s.”110 
Perhaps most harmful for the prisoner tort plaintiff, the FTCA’s 
discretionary function exception has an analogue in state immunity 
doctrines for discretionary conduct.111  Some states provide for a 
discretionary function exception by statute;112 others do so by judicial 
decision.  Washington, for instance, alone among the states, makes 
governmental defendants “liable in tort on the same terms as private 
 
    103.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). 
 104.  See Nguyen v. United States, 556 F.3d 1244, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 2009); Sutton v. United 
States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1295–97 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 105.  See Nguyen, 556 F.3d at 1257 (citing cases from various circuits). 
 106.  See also infra text accompanying note 223. 
 107.  28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1997); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 28 n.1 (1980). 
 108.  28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1997); see also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 28 n.1. 
 109.  See supra text accompanying notes 85–89. 
 110.  Preis, supra note 44, at 746 (citing Rosenthal, supra note 54, at 805–09). 
 111.  See generally 1 CIV. ACTIONS AGAINST STATE & LOC. GOV’TS §§ 2:7, :11, 3:17. 
 112.  Compare, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(d) (West 2012) with 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) 
(2006); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(5) (West 2013). 
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tortfeasors,”113 but even there the Washington Supreme Court has read a 
discretionary exception into the statute.114  The language from the 
Washington decision captures the sort of considerations involved: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision necessarily involve a 
basic governmental policy, program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision essential to the 
realization or accomplishment of that policy, program, or objective as 
opposed to one which would not change the course or direction of the 
policy, program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the exercise of basic 
policy evaluation, judgment, and expertise on the part of the 
governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the requisite 
constitutional, statutory, or lawful authority and duty to do or make the 
challenged act, omission, or decision? 
If these preliminary questions can be clearly and unequivocally 
answered in the affirmative, then the challenged act, omission, or 
decision can, with a reasonable degree of assurance, be classified as a 
discretionary governmental process and nontortious, regardless of its 
unwisdom.115 
The Washington Supreme Court later clarified that, to benefit from 
the discretionary exemption, the state must show that an actual, 
conscious balancing of risks actually took place.116   
Moreover, just as in FTCA law, particular instances of carrying out 
a discretionary policy may be held to be ministerial and therefore not 
immune from liability—the doctrine is often called the “planning-
operational test,”117 indicating that (discretionary) planning decisions are 
generally immune from liability while (non-discretionary) operational 
decisions aren’t.118  For instance, when Florida prisoner Thomas 
 
 113.  Rosenthal, supra note 54, at 804 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.92.090, 4.96.010 
(West 2013)). 
 114.  Evang. United Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 407 P.2d 440, 443–45 (Wash. 1965). 
 115.  Evang. United, 407 P.2d at 445.  This test has been cited in various prison cases, for 
instance Barnum v. State, 435 P.2d 678 (Wash. 1967); Swatek v. County of Dane, 516 N.W.2d 789 
at *5 (Wis. App. 1994) (table), rev’d, 531 N.W.2d 45 (Wis. 1995).  
 116.  King v. City of Seattle, 525 P.2d 228 (Wash. 1974). 
 117.  1 CIV. ACTIONS AGAINST STATE & LOC. GOV’TS § 2:7 (2012). 
 118.  Iowa has abandoned the bright-line planning-operational test and instead adopted the 
two-prong test of Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).  See Goodman v. City of 
LeClaire, 587 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 1998).  But this is just another way of implementing the 
discretionary function exemption.  See Walker v. State, 801 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 2011) (applying the 
16
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Dunagan was attacked by a fellow inmate who strangled him into 
unconsciousness and drove ballpoint pens into his eyes, a county sheriff 
was held liable for not following policies regarding opening and closing 
of cell doors119—even if there might have been no liability for failing to 
adopt such a policy in the first place. 
Still—again, just as in FTCA law—this discretionary doctrine can 
bar recovery for many prisoner plaintiffs.  Thus, when an Indiana 
juvenile inmate was sexually assaulted by other juvenile inmates and 
sued the county for not allocating sufficient resources to security, it was 
unclear whether the county that ran the juvenile detention center had 
actually engaged in a policy analysis in deciding on resource 
allocation.120  What was clear was that if further factual development 
revealed that a policy analysis had been done, the county would be 
immune from liability.121 
In addition, statutes in many states further limit prisoner tort  
plaintiffs’ prospects.  Every state is different and has its own exclusions, 
so let me provide a small, somewhat arbitrary sample of such laws, some 
of which relate to sovereign immunity (the immunity of the state), some 
of which relate to official immunity (the personal immunity of the 
employee), and some of which relate to both:122 
• In California, with some exceptions, “neither a public entity 
nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide a prison, 
jail or penal or correctional facility or, if such facility is 
provided, for failure to provide sufficient equipment, 
personnel or facilities therein.”123  Similar provisions appear 
in the laws of several states;124 Mississippi law is barely more 
generous, requiring only that “reasonable use of available 
appropriations ha[ve] been made to provide such personnel or 
facilities.”125 
• Oklahoma goes beyond California and also excludes 
governmental liability arising out of the “operation or 
 
Berkovitz test in a prison context and holding that discretionary-function exception didn’t apply).  
 119.  Dunagan v. Seely, 533 So. 2d 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). 
 120.  Lake Cnty. Juv. Ct. v. Swanson, 671 N.E.2d 429, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). 
 121.  Id. at 439–40. 
 122.  See generally 1 CIV. ACTIONS AGAINST STATE & LOC. GOV’TS § 3:17 (2012). 
 123.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.2 (West 2013). The exceptions include anything in “Chapter 2 
(commencing with Section 830),” which can include, for instance, dangerous conditions of public 
property, id. § 840.2. 
 124.  See, e.g., 745 ILL. REV. STAT. 10/4-103 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-1 (West 
2013). 
 125.  See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(1)(r) (West 2012). 
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maintenance” of prisons, jails, or juvenile facilities;126 West 
Virginia is similar.127  Ohio—after having generally 
immunized political subdivisions—then specifically makes 
them liable for injury “caused by the negligence of their 
employees and that occurs within the grounds of, and is due to 
physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that 
are used in connection with the performance of a 
governmental function”; but specifically excluded from this 
extension of liability are jails and other detention facilities.128 
• Utah simply states that immunity of governmental entities is 
not waived if the injury arises out of “the incarceration of any 
person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of 
legal confinement”;129 New York has a similar statute  
covering employees;130 Mississippi has a statute covering 
both.131  South Carolina immunizes governmental entities in a 
similarly blanket way, though it makes an exception for gross 
negligence.132 
• Arizona excludes governmental and employee liability for 
prisoner-on-prisoner violence, as long as there was no 
intentional or grossly negligent conduct by the state 
employee;133 California also immunizes public entities 
(though not public employees) for such violence.134  Several 
states also exclude liability for injuries caused by escaped or 
escaping prisoners.135 
• Illinois specifically excludes both governmental and 
employee liability “for injury proximately caused by the 
failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care,” 
though it does impose liability on an employee who, “acting 
within the scope of his employment, knows from his 
observation of conditions that the prisoner is in need of 
immediate medical care and, through willful and wanton 
 
 126.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155(24)–(25) (West 2013). 
 127.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-12A-5(a)(14) (West 2013). 
 128.  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2744.02(B)(4) (West 2013); see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-
12A-4(c)(4).  
 129.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301(5)(j) (West 2012). 
 130.  N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (McKinney 2013). 
 131.  MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-46-9(m) (West 2012). 
 132.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(25) (2012). 
 133.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.02(A)(4) (West 2013). 
 134.  CAL. GOV’T CODE § 844.6(a), (d) (West 2013). 
 135.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-820.02(A)(2); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.8(b); ILL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 745, ¶ 10/4-106(b) (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(b) (West 1998). 
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conduct, fails to take reasonable action to summon medical 
care.”136 
Lawrence Rosenthal summarizes: “thirty-three states recognize 
discretionary-function immunity, twenty-three recognize immunity for 
injuries caused by reliance on statutes or other enactments, . . . seventeen 
immunize specified intentional torts of public employees, and forty 
states confer immunity from punitive damages.”137  “In addition, forty-
two states limit the damages recoverable from a governmental defendant 
or a public employee.”138  Of course, all these numbers are below fifty, 
which means that some other states don’t have such immunity;139 but the 
fact remains that in many states, whether by common law or by statute, a 
state inmate suing his prison may be in just as bad a position as his  
federal counterpart. 
IV. TORTS AND PRIVATE PRISONS 
A  Suing Federal or State Governments Themselves 
Bottom line: good luck if you want to bring a tort claim against a 
private prison, whether state or federal.  But when it comes to suing 
private prisons, several of these limitations are entirely absent. 
Of course, for federal private-prison inmates, suits against the 
United States directly are out.  The FTCA waives sovereign immunity 
only for acts of employees of the government.140  Government 
employees are defined to include (among others) officers, employees, 
and persons working on behalf of “any federal agency,” and “federal 
agency,” in turn, specifically excludes contractors.141 
Thus, when federal prisoner Reagan Logue hanged himself in a 
county jail awaiting trial, Logue’s parents were unable to sue the United 
States for the negligence of the jail employees who failed to keep him 
under surveillance.142  The FTCA, the Supreme Court held, incorporates 
the common-law distinction between employees and contractors based 
on the principal’s “authority . . . to control the physical conduct of the 
contractor in the performance of the contract,” and that authority was 
 
 136.  745 ILL. REV. STAT. 10/4-105 (West 2013). 
 137.  Rosenthal, supra note 54, at 805–06. 
 138.  Id. at 810. 
 139.  Preis, supra note 44, at 746. 
 140.  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2013). 
 141.  Id. § 2671. 
 142.  Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973). 
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lacking as between the federal government and the county officials.143  
Nor could the county officials be characterized as “acting on behalf of a 
federal agency in an official capacity”; if they could, so could most 
contractors, which would make the explicit exclusion of contractors in 
the definition of “federal agency” kind of pointless.144 
What was true in Logue for local officials is also true for people 
and corporations that are more conventionally thought of as 
contractors.145  The United States is liable neither for the negligence of 
its independent-contractor physicians146 nor for that of private prison 
companies contracting with the federal government.147  Thus, if you’re  
like Vernice Garvin, an inmate at the Northeast Ohio Correctional 
Center in Youngstown, Ohio, trying to hold the United States liable 
because he was negligently housed with an inmate with a staph 
infection, you lose: NEOCC is operated by the Corrections Corporation 
of America, a federal contractor.148 
Much the same is true for state private-prison inmates: state tort 
claims acts, the state analogues of the FTCA, also waive state sovereign 
immunity for the acts of employees, not contractors.149  As a result, 
suing the state directly typically seems to be out. 
B. Suing Prison Firms: The Common Law 
But if suits against the United States under the FTCA by federal 
inmates are out, suits against the companies themselves under ordinary 
 
 143.  Id. at 526–30. 
 144.  Id. at 530–32. 
 145.  See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807 (1976); cf. Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 
355–57 (D.N.J. 2004). 
 146.  See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 305 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (D. Kan. 2004). 
 147.  See, e.g., Vega v. United States, No. C11-632-RSM, 2011 WL 6014853 (W.D. Wash. 
Dec. 2, 2011). 
 148.  Garvin v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 4:11CV02054, 2012 WL 262725 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 
2012). 
 149.  See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001 (West 2013) (“‘Employee’ 
means a person, including an officer or agent, who is in the paid service of a governmental unit by 
competent authority, but does not include an independent contractor, an agent or employee of an 
independent contractor, or a person who performs tasks the details of which the governmental unit 
does not have the legal right to control.”) (emphasis added); Thomas v. Harris Cnty., 30 S.W.3d 51 
(Tex. App. 2000); see also Josephine R. Potuto, Forum Choice in Constitutional Litigation, 78 NEB. 
L. REV. 550, 569 (1999).  For a useful summary of state tort claims acts, see State Sovereign 
Immunity and Tort Liability, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (updated Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/transport/state-sovereign-immunity-and-tort-liability.aspx.   
  Note that, in 1989, Ira Robbins characterized the applicability of state tort claims acts to 
private contractors as an open question.  Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private 
Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531, 650–52 (1989). 
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tort law aren’t—whether for federal or state inmates.  In Correctional 
Services Corp. v. Malesko,150 John Malesko sued the corporation 
running the community correction center in which he was housed, 
charging that the corporation and some of its employees were “negligent 
in failing to obtain requisite medication for [his] condition and were 
further negligent by refusing [him] the use of the elevator.”151  Because 
he was a federal inmate, he brought his claim under Bivens.  The 
Supreme Court denied the Bivens claim primarily on a no-entity-liability 
theory152 (foreshadowed in the public context by FDIC v. Meyer153), but 
it was also quick to point out his alternative remedies: 
[A]lternative remedies are at least as great, and in many respects 
greater, than anything that could be had under Bivens.  For example, 
federal prisoners in private facilities enjoy a parallel tort remedy that is 
unavailable to prisoners housed in Government facilities.  This case 
demonstrates as much, since respondent’s complaint in the District 
Court arguably alleged no more than a quintessential claim of 
negligence. . . . [T]he heightened “deliberate indifference” standard of 
Eighth Amendment liability would make it considerably more difficult 
for respondent to prevail than on a theory of ordinary negligence.154 
The Malesko dissent denied that the existence of alternative 
remedies should doom a Bivens claim,155 but didn’t deny that these 
attractive alternative remedies existed. 
These same considerations were on display in Minneci itself, where 
the Court finally said what one could have guessed from Malesko: 
Bivens relief is not only unavailable against a corporation but is also not 
necessarily available even against an individual in the private-prison 
Eighth-Amendment setting.156 
As I mentioned above,157 Richard Lee Pollard complained of being 
mistreated by employees of the federal private prison in which he was 
housed; allegedly he was forced to wear very painful restraints and was 
deprived of therapy, hygienic care, and sufficient medicine.  The Court 
wrote, sensibly enough, that these claims are within the core of state tort 
 
 150.  534 U.S. 61 (2001). 
 151.  Id. at 64–65.  Malesko couldn’t sue the employees because they were time-limited out by 
the statute of limitations.  Id. at 65. 
 152.  Id. at 70–72. 
 153.  510 U.S. 471 (1993). 
 154.  Corr. Servs. Corp. 534 U.S. at 72–73 (citations omitted). 
 155.  Id. at 79–80. 
 156.  Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623–26 (2012). 
 157.  See supra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
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law, including in California, where this claim arose.158  The Fourth 
Circuit commented similarly on Ricky Lee Holly’s claim of inadequate 
medical care, pointing to North Carolina law;159 and the Tenth Circuit 
(in a short-lived opinion) likewise noted that Kansas law “gives rise to a 
negligence claim” for Cornelius Peoples’s claim that his jailors failed to 
protect him from an attack by gang members.160 
A recent California case cited by the Supreme Court illustrates the 
different treatment of public and private actors.  Denisha Lawson was a 
California prisoner in a community-based correctional facility operated 
by Center Point, Inc., where she lived with her infant daughter 
Esperanza.161  Lawson sued the state and its employees, and Center 
Point and its employees, for the physical injury that Esperanza 
experienced, and the emotional distress that she herself experienced, 
when the defendants failed to get medical treatment for Esperanza’s 
respiratory infection.162  Esperanza wasn’t a prisoner, so let’s just focus 
on Denisha Lawson’s own emotional distress claim.  Her claim was 
dismissed as to the state and its employees based on concepts of 
governmental immunity,163 as discussed above.164  But as to Center 
Point and its employees, the story was quite different: 
The Petition cites no authority, and we are aware of none, that extends 
the governmental immunity set forth in the Tort Claims Act to a 
private entity working under contract for the State . . . .  Accordingly, 
we conclude that Center Point is not a “public entity” and thus is not 
entitled to claim the immunity set forth in the Tort Claims Act.165 
Nor is this just a California rule.  The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides that “[o]ne who is required by law to take or who 
 
 158.  Id. at 624 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1714(a), 1714.8(a) (West 2013); Giraldo v. Cal. 
Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 384 (App. 2008)). 
 159.  Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 296 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Summey v. Barker, 573 S.E.2d 
534, 536 (N.C. App. 2002)).  In Summey v. Barker, hemophiliac Joseph Patrick Summey sued a 
county sheriff, a jailor, and medical providers for negligence in treating his nosebleed while he was 
a detainee.  He lost, but it was on the merits (no one acted negligently).  Summey, 573 S.E.2d at 536.  
See also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008) (Georgia tort law is an adequate 
avenue to challenge CCA’s policy of skimping on medical care). 
 160.  Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1103–04 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing 
Washington v. State, 839 P.2d 555 (1992)), rev’d by an evenly divided en banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 
(10th Cir. 2006). 
 161.  Lawson v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 834, 839 (App. 2010). 
 162.  Id. at 839.  
 163.  Id. at 843–46. 
 164.  See supra text accompanying notes 122–136; CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 815, 815.2, 815.6, 
844.6, 845.6 (West 2013). 
 165.  Lawson, 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 855. 
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voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to 
deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection” has a duty 
“(a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and (b) 
to give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are 
ill or injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by 
others.”166  Jailors are also under a duty to reasonably control third 
persons to prevent them from harming their charges.167  An illustration 
shows jailors’ general duty of care—which would apply just as well to 
public jailors but for the immunity doctrines discussed above:168 
A is imprisoned in a jail, of which B is the jailor.  A suffers an attack 
of appendicitis, and cries for medical assistance.  B does nothing to  
obtain it for three days, as a result of which A’s illness is aggravated in 
a manner which proper medical attention would have avoided.  B is 
subject to liability to A for the aggravation of his illness.169 
Such duties exist in all states that have federal prisons.170 
This is not to say that state remedies are always the same as what 
one might get under Bivens.  Most obviously, as I’ve noted, state 
remedies are more attractive because the general negligence standard is 
more plaintiff-friendly than the “deliberate indifference” required under 
the Eighth Amendment and because tort law’s respondeat superior 
doctrine is unavailable under Bivens.171  On the other hand, the 
determination of whether the defendant was negligent will inevitably be 
colored by the realities of prison life and the necessity of keeping 
discipline; and inmates may not always make the most sympathetic 
plaintiffs (though private prison companies may also be unpopular). 
Moreover, tort-reform measures can sometimes make state remedies less 
attractive: the Minneci Court noted damage caps, bars on recovery for 
emotional suffering without physical harm, or miscellaneous other 
procedural obstacles.172 
 
 166.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965). 
 167.  Id. § 320. 
 168.  See supra text accompanying notes 122–136. 
 169.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 173, § 314A, illust. 6 (based on Farmer 
v. State, 79 So. 2d 528 (Miss. 1955); Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 104 N.E.2d 872 (N.Y. 1952) 
(jailee not a prisoner); Winston v. United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962) (en banc) (FTCA 
case), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963), see supra text accompanying 
notes 91–92; Thomas v. Williams, 124 S.E.2d 409 (Ga. App. 1962); Smith v. Miller, 40 N.W.2d 
597 (Iowa 1950); O’Dell v. Goodsell, 30 N.W.2d 906 (Neb. 1948)). 
 170.  Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 624–25 (2012) (citing cases from California, Georgia, 
Mississippi, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas). 
 171.  See supra text accompanying notes 45–46. 
 172.  Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 625 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West 2013); Pollard v. 
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But, the Minneci Court concluded, particular procedural quirks 
don’t matter; all that’s required is a system with roughly similar 
compensation rules that produces roughly similar incentives for 
defendants.173  Chief Justice Warren, recognizing FTCA liability for 
prison negligence in United States v. Muniz,174 had refused to import 
“the casuistries of municipal liability for torts” by giving effect to 
divergent state immunity rules,175 and Bivens cases have also pointed to 
the desire to avoid subjecting plaintiffs to the “niceties”176 or 
“vagaries”177 of state tort law.  Indeed, it does seem somewhat 
incongruous that a constitutional violation, which is judged by the same 
rules in California as in Georgia, should be differently compensated 
under California and Georgia tort law.  Muniz is still good law for the 
FTCA treatment of federal immunity at federal public prisons; but for 
Bivens liability of federal private prisons, the new rule is that, when state 
schemes are roughly similar, we are subject to the vagaries of state tort 
law.  Sometimes this will produce better results for plaintiffs, sometimes 
worse; it seems hard to maintain that the result will be generally worse 
for plaintiffs.  Tellingly, Justice Ginsburg’s lone dissent focused on the 
vagaries, not the inadequacy of the state remedy.178 
C. Suing Prison Firms: Immunity Statutes 
The common-law approach I’ve sketched above is the approach 
taken by most states.  In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, 
private prison firms are treated just like any other kind of firm.  Nor is 
the government contractor immunity recognized in Boyle v. United 
 
GEO Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 843, 864 (9th Cir. 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, § 2853 (West 
2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 231, § 60(B) (West 2013)). 
 173.  Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 625; see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 
2008) (requiring that a tort plaintiff in a medical malpractice case file an expert affidavit doesn’t 
negate the adequacy of the state-law remedy, because the indigent inmate would be in the same 
position as a free citizen who is poor); Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1104–05 
(10th Cir. 2005) (punitive damages cap doesn’t negate adequacy), rev’d by an evenly divided en 
banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 174.  United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 150 (1963).  
 175.  Id. at 164 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 n.1 (1955)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 176.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394 
(1971). 
 177.  Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23, 28 n.1 (1980); Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409-410 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 178.  Minneci, 132 S. Ct. at 626–27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Peoples v. CCA 
Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1112 (10th Cir. 2005) (Ebel, J., concurring and dissenting), rev’d by 
an evenly divided en banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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Technologies Corp.179 available for federal private prisons, at least not 
unless the conduct complained of was specifically mandated by the 
federal government.180 
Perhaps out of an excess of caution, Tennessee has even passed 
legislation explicitly foreclosing the application of sovereign immunity 
to private prisons: a state statute provides that “[t]he sovereign immunity 
of the state shall not apply to the contractor.”181  The statute requires that 
private prison contractors carry liability insurance, “specifically 
including insurance for civil rights claims,”182 and “[n]either the  
contractor nor [its] insurer . . . may plead the defense of sovereign 
immunity in any action arising out of the performance of the 
contract.”183 
New Mexico’s statutory regime, which requires private prison 
contractors to “assume[] all liability caused by or arising out of all 
aspects of the provision or operation of the facility”184 and carry 
adequate liability insurance,185 seems to grant somewhat more immunity 
to private prison employees who perform the functions of correctional 
officers.  The statute classifies these employees as “correctional officers” 
for the purposes of two statutory sections and “no other purpose of state 
law.”186  One of these sections relates to the qualifications of 
correctional officers (adult citizens of good moral character with at least 
a high school education and having passed certain physical and aptitude 
exams).187  Another grants correctional officers the “power of a peace 
officer with respect to arrests and enforcement of the laws” in certain 
circumstances.188  The section also provides that “[n]o correctional 
officer or other employee of the corrections department shall be 
convicted or held liable for any act performed pursuant to this section if 
a peace officer could lawfully have performed the same act in the same 
circumstances.”189  So private prison guards seem to be as immune as 
public prison guards while making arrests and enforcing the law. 
But, notably, the statute does not incorporate the statutory section 
 
 179.  487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
 180.  See id. at 512; Adorno v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 181.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-107(b) (West 2013). 
 182.  Id. § 41-24-107(a)(2). 
 183.  Id. § 41-24-107(b). 
 184.  N.M. STAT. § 33-1-17(D)(2) (West 2013). 
 185.  Id. § 33-1-17(D)(3). 
 186.  Id. § 33-1-17(E). 
 187.  Id. § 33-1-11. 
 188.  Id. § 33-1-10. 
 189.  Id. 
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granting general tort immunity to all public employees.190 So private 
prison guard immunity apparently doesn’t extend to their day-to-day 
activities that can’t be classified as arrests or law enforcement. 
North Carolina has gone all the way and actually immunized 
private prison employees to the same extent as public ones.  The statute 
makes “[c]ustodial officials employed by a private confinement 
facility . . . agents of the Secretary of Public Safety,”191 and as such, they 
(and their employers, the private prison firms, under respondeat 
superior) are entitled to assert the same public official immunity as their  
public counterparts.192  (Public officers in North Carolina aren’t liable 
for mere negligence unless an exception applies, for instance unless their 
conduct is shown to be “malicious, corrupt, or outside the scope of 
official authority.”193) But while official immunity protects the officers, 
North Carolina does waive its sovereign immunity, at least up to the 
amount of a statutory bond,194 so inmates aren’t without a remedy. 
As far as I can tell, North Carolina is the only state to have 
extended such broad immunity.  Thus, in most states, the liability of 
private prison firms and their employees is governed by regular 
common-law negligence rules. 
V. THE POSSIBLE NEUTRALITY OF THE PLRA(S) 
A. The Federal PLRA 
I still haven’t mentioned one aspect of prison litigation—the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, which adds even more procedural restrictions on 
prisoner litigation and has been responsible for a massive decrease in 
federal prisoner litigation since its adoption in 1996.195  Here are its 
main provisions: 
• Prospective relief in litigation over prison conditions must be 
narrowly tailored to the violation identified.196  Essentially, 
the PLRA took a standard that had always applied to 
prospective relief stemming from a final judgment and 
 
 190.  Id. § 41-4-4(A). 
 191.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-37(g) (West 2013). 
 192.  Robinson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 1:02cv78, 2002 WL 31770492, at *3 (W.D.N.C. 
Aug. 26, 2002). 
 193.  See Epps v. Duke Univ., 468 S.E.2d 846, 852–53 (N.C. App. 1996). 
 194.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-76-5 (West 2013); Summey v. Barker, 544 S.E.2d 262, 265 
(N.C. App. 2001). 
 195.  See Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1634–44. 
 196.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(a) (West 2013). 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss2/1
ARTICLE 1 - VOLOKH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:21 AM 
2013] THE MODEST EFFECT OF MINNECI 313 
applied it to consent decrees as well.197  Parties are still free 
to enter into “private settlement agreements” that are 
enforceable as contracts in state court,198 though it remains to 
be seen how effective such agreements will be.199  Similarly, 
consent decrees are now easier to terminate.200  This was  
Congress’s attempt to cut down on “population caps and other 
inappropriate regulatory orders imposed on prisons and jails 
by prisoners’-rights crusader [judges] who had seized control 
of state and local systems.”201 
• Where once the requirement that prisoners must exhaust their 
administrative remedies was a matter of court discretion and 
depended on the adequacy of the administrative procedures, 
now the exhaustion requirement is mandatory, even if the 
administrative procedure can’t grant the remedy sought.202  
(This aspect of the statute, which attracted little notice at first, 
has since been identified as one of the statute’s most powerful 
provisions for cutting down on inmate litigation.203) 
• Indigent inmates have to “pay filing fees in nonhabeas civil 
actions if they have any money in their prison accounts.”204  
Similarly, if costs are awarded against a defendant, courts no 
longer have the discretion to give indigent inmate plaintiffs a 
break.205 
• There’s a “frequent filer” penalty: “Inmates who have had 
three prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous or 
malicious, or for failing to state a claim upon which relief 
may be granted . . . may not proceed in forma pauperis at all 
unless they face ‘imminent danger of serious physical 
harm.’”206 
• Complaints are screened by district courts before docketing, 
 
 197.  JOHN  BOSTON, THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 8 (Feb. 27, 2006), available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Boston_PLRA_Treatise.pdf; Alison Brill, Rights Without 
Remedy: The Myth of State Court Accessibility After the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 30 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 645, 658 (2008).  
 198.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2). 
 199.  See generally Brill, supra note 197. 
 200.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(1), (3). 
 201.  Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1566; see also Brill, supra note 197, at 656–57. 
 202.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1996); see also Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1627–28. 
 203.  Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1650; see generally id. at 1649–54. 
 204.  Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1628, 1645–48; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914, 1915(b)(1)–(2) 
(West 2013). 
 205.  Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1629; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A). 
 206.  Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1628–29, 1648–49; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 
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and can be dismissed “without motion, notice to the plaintiff, 
or opportunity to respond.”207 
• Defendants can fail to respond without their failure being 
deemed an admission,208 and courts can’t order a response 
unless “the plaintiff has a reasonable opportunity to prevail on 
the merits.”209 
• Inmates can’t recover for mental or emotional injury without 
a prior showing of physical injury.210 
• Any amounts recovered have to be diverted “directly to 
satisfy any outstanding restitution orders pending against the 
[inmate].”211 
• And the PLRA limits attorneys’ contingent rates to 25%,212 
limits the total fees that inmates’ attorneys can recover to 
150% of the judgment,213 and limits hourly fees to 150% of 
court-appointed counsel rates.214 
The PLRA was part of a broad movement to restrict prisoner 
litigation.  Around the same time, Congress also required federal legal 
services providers to stop representing inmates215 and (in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act) restricted the availability 
of habeas relief,216 and the Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive 
view of inmates’ constitutional right of access to a law library.217 
But none of these sections distinguish between prisoners in public 
and private prisons.  For example, with respect to several of the 
provisions listed above, “prisoner” is defined as “any person 
incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, 
sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law 
 
 207.  Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1629–30; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1)–(2). 
 208.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(1) (West 2013). 
 209.  Id. § 1997e(g)(2); see also Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1630. 
 210.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(2) (2011), added by Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 806, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1630. 
 211.  Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 807, 110 Stat. 1321-75 
to -76, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3626; see also Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1631. 
 212.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2). 
 213.  Id.; see also Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1631. 
 214.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3); see also Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1631, 1654–57. 
 215.  Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
134, § 504(a)(15), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-55; see also Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1632.  
 216.  Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–2255 and adding new sections, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–
2266); see also Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1632–33. 
 217.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
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or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 
diversionary program.”218  This definition is quite broad and, in 
particular, makes no mention of the identity of the prison manager.  For 
the section on injunctive relief and settlements, the definition of 
“prisoner” refers to “any facility,”219 and “prison” means “any Federal, 
State, or local facility that incarcerates or details juveniles or adults  
accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 
violations of criminal law”220—again not distinguishing between public 
and private. 221 
So while the PLRA has had a huge effect on inmate litigation as a 
whole, it seems to have little obvious comparative effect on the 
attractiveness of federal-law litigation by inmates in the public or private 
sector.222  (This federal-law litigation would certainly include Bivens and 
§ 1983 litigation, and, I suppose, also tort litigation against federal 
public prisons, which proceeds under the FTCA.223)  State-law litigation 
against federal private prisons, especially in state courts, emerges from 
the PLRA relatively untouched, which is again an advantage of litigation 
against private prisons. 
B.  State PLRAs 
Inmates have to deal not only with the federal PLRA but also with 
parallel state PLRAs. 
The following are a few examples.  The Louisiana PLRA,224 like 
the federal version, has a requirement of narrowly tailored remedies,225 
 
 218.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). 
 219.  18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(3) (West 2013). 
 220.  Id. at § 3626(g)(5). 
 221.  See also Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 1999) (private prison inmates 
must comply with PLRA). 
 222.  The PLRA requirements typically apply to litigation under federal law.  See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 1997e(a), (c), (f)(1), (g); 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2).  But note that different PLRA sections 
have their own coverage; thus, the limitation on recovery for emotional injuries in § 1997e(e) 
applies to all federal civil actions (including, I suppose, diversity actions in federal court based 
entirely on state law); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (West 2013). 
 223.  The FTCA already contains many PLRA-like restrictions.  FTCA plaintiffs also have to 
exhaust their administrative remedies; they must file administrative claims within two years, and 
file their federal district court suit within six months after their administrative claim is denied.  28 
U.S.C. § 2401(b) (West 2013).  Attorney fees under the FTCA are capped at 20% of any 
administrative settlement made before the lawsuit or 25% of any other settlement or judgment.  Id 
§ 2678.  Further, felons can’t sue for emotional injury only (a restriction added by the PLRA itself). 
18 U.S.C § 1346(b)(2) (West 2013) , added by Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 806, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). 
 224.  LA. REV. STAT. § 15:1181–1193 (West 2013). 
 225.  Id. § 15:1182. 
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an exhaustion requirement,226 a ban on emotional recovery without 
physical injury,227 limitations on attorney fees,228 restrictions on in forma 
pauperis filings,229 and frequent filer penalties.230  The Pennsylvania  
PLRA231 has restrictions on in forma pauperis filings,232 frequent filer 
penalties,233 and a requirement of narrowly tailored remedies.234  The 
Michigan PLRA235 has an exhaustion requirement,236 restrictions on in 
forma pauperis filings,237 frequent filer penalties,238 a ban on emotional 
recovery without physical injury,239 and a requirement of narrowly 
tailored remedies.240 
And these aren’t flukes: around the time the federal PLRA was 
passed, 
state attorneys general and departments of corrections expected to see 
some movement from federal to state court. Indeed, the  National 
Association of Attorneys General pushed hard for state PLRAs . . . .  
Largely as a result of this push, all but a few states now have some 
kind of system that specially regulates inmate access to state court.241 
State PLRAs generally seem to apply very broadly: to public as 
well as private prisons, state as well as federal prisons, tort as well as 
state and federal constitutional claims, and even in federal court to the 
extent the claims are based on state law.242 I’m aware of one court, the 
Maryland Supreme Court, that has held that its own statute, the Prison 
 
 226.  Id. § 15:1184(A)(2). 
 227.  Id. § 15:1184(E). 
 228.  Id. § 15:1185(B). 
 229.  Id. § 15:1186. 
 230.  Id. § 15:1187. 
 231.  42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6601–6608 (West 2013). 
 232.  Id. § 6602(a)–(e). 
 233.  Id. § 6602(f). 
 234.  Id. § 6604. 
 235.  MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 600.5501–.5531 (West 2013). 
 236.  Id. § 600.5503(1). 
 237.  Id. § 600.2963. 
 238.  Id. § 600.5507. 
 239.  Id. § 600.5511. 
 240.  Id. § 600.5517. 
 241.  See Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1635; see also id. at 1635 n.272 (giving a table of state 
statutes); Brill, supra note 197, at 676–78. 
 242.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1181(2) (West 2013) (“prisoner suit” includes “any 
civil proceeding with respect to the conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by 
government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6601 
(West 2013) (similar); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5501 (West 2013) (similar).  State PLRAs would 
obviously be applied in federal court under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), but 
this would even have been true in the days of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
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Litigation Act (PLA), doesn’t apply to—or at least doesn’t require 
exhaustion of administrative remedies for—inmates at private prisons,243 
on grounds that seem somewhat dubious.244  But the Maryland Court’s 
reasoning is probably idiosyncratic.  Chances are that any prison 
litigation, regarding any prison, on any theory, in any court, will be 
severely limited by some PLRA, whether state or federal. 
And this, indeed, is why I’ve left the discussion of the PLRAs to 
fairly late in this Article.  At worst, a PLRA will limit any prison 
litigation, so that the existence of PLRAs won’t alter the relative 
attractiveness of private-prison vs. public-prison litigation.  At best, an 
inmate may find himself in some PLRA gap—for instance, because his 
state has no state PLRA or because he’s in a state like Maryland—in 
which case litigation against private prisons may be somewhat more 
attractive. 
VI. WHAT DOES THIS TELL US ABOUT BIVENS DOCTRINE? 
None of which is to say that Minneci was correctly decided.  There 
are cogent arguments that the Supreme Court has been far too hostile to 
the Bivens remedy.  I have no Grand Theory of Bivens, civil rights 
litigation, or immunity, but I do tend toward the following views. Fully 
defending them would require an entirely separate article, but here they 
are in summary form. 
A. Preliminaries 
Perhaps federal sovereign immunity is a bad idea, for both ex post 
compensatory and ex ante deterrence/accountability245 reasons, though 
 
 243.  Adamson v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 753 A.2d 501, 505–19 (Md. 2000). 
 244.  The state Prison Litigation Act defined “civil action” broadly, as “a legal action seeking 
money damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or any appeal filed in any court in the State that 
relates to or involves a prisoner’s conditions of confinement.”  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 5-1001(c)(1) (West 2012).  The statute even specified that “civil action” includes, among other 
things, “[a]ny action alleging a violation of civil rights against a custodian, the custodian’s officers 
and employees, or any official or employee of the Department.”  Id. § 5-1001(c)(2)(4).  These 
sections seem on their face to include private prisons and their employees as possible defendants, 
especially since “custodian” is also defined broadly, as “the institution or agency that has custody of 
the prisoner.”  Id. § 5-1001(e).  Nonetheless, the Court held that “a plain reading” of the statute, 
together with legislative history and purposive considerations, “overwhelmingly demonstrate that 
the PLA administrative remedy exhaustion requirement does not apply to lawsuits filed by inmates 
against private contractors alleging a claim of medical malpractice.”  Adamson, 753 A.2d at 517.  
Part of the reasoning relied on the grievance system’s being useless for private inmates, but part of 
the reasoning rested on the definition of “civil action,” so it’s possible that none of the state PLA 
applies to private prisons. 
 245.  See Developments in the Law, supra note 57, at 1880–82; Alexander Volokh, 
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the arguments for both prongs of this argument are far from airtight.246  
However, I also incline to the view that making the federal government 
pay damages without statutory authorization is probably foreclosed by 
the Appropriations Clause, which provides that “No Money shall be 
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made 
by Law.”247  So perhaps the best approach would be, as others have 
already suggested, a beefed-up FTCA that would (bypassing individual 
officers’ defenses like qualified immunity) allow constitutional tort suits 
directly against the government.248 
However, even with federal sovereign immunity for damages as a 
constitutionally mandated baseline, Bivens may still be valid.  Liability 
for officials in their individual capacity really does come out of 
individual pockets and thus doesn’t implicate the concern that Congress 
authorize appropriations.  Nor is this just a silly fiction:249 if it’s true that 
indemnification is near-universal,250 this is only because government 
agencies—presumably authorized by Congress251—find it almost always 
advantageous to offer such indemnification as a term of employment.  
That’s their choice, and indeed, they routinely deny indemnification in 
some (admittedly rare) cases, like where the employee is being 
criminally investigated or prosecuted for the same conduct.252  
Individual liability, and individual defenses like qualified immunity, still 
serve a real purpose, despite the ubiquity of indemnity. 
 
Privatization and the Elusive Employee-Contractor Distinction, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 147–
52 (2012). 
 246.  Cf., e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
509, 566–81 (1986) (making the argument in the related context of whether to compensate losers for 
changes in policy). 
 247.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.  On the Appropriations Clause argument for federal sovereign 
immunity as to damages, see Rosenthal, supra note 54, at 802–03; Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the 
Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. 
REV. 521, 543–46 (2003); OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424–26 (1990); Paul F. Figley & Jay 
Tidmarsh, The Appropriations Power and Sovereign Immunity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2009).  
But see Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
289, 344 n.263 (1995) (arguing that “a Bivens award is an appropriation made under the 
Constitution, and hence by law”); J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 1162, 1168 (arguing that “the conventional notion of Congress’s ‘power of the purse’ 
rests on an unstated (and unsubstantiated) assumption that ‘by Law’ envisions only legislation”); see 
also Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 38–46 (2002) 
(arguing that government liability stems from the treatment of suits against the United States as 
within the judicial power).  
 248.  Reinert, supra note 54, at 815 n.20, 814 n.18 (collecting sources), 816 n.23. 
 249.  Pillard, supra note 54, at 67. 
 250.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 251.  See Pillard, supra note 54, at 77 n.54. 
 252.  See id. at 77 n.56. 
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Moreover, despite a common view that Bivens suits are almost 
universally failures and that qualified immunity is an important bar to 
recovery, Alexander Reinert has found that Bivens suits are more 
successful than has previously been supposed, based on a new analysis  
that takes account of “unpublished case reports and dockets.”253  
According to his analysis, qualified immunity isn’t a very important bar 
to recovery.254  If this is so, maybe some form of Bivens all by itself is 
just fine;255 revamping the FTCA, as suggested above,256 might not even 
be necessary. 
How much Bivens, then, do we need?  It’s quite plausible that 
courts have been too stingy with Bivens.  Courts have expressed a 
concern that Bivens “is implied without any express congressional 
authority whatsoever”257 or that adding “a federal damages remedy to 
existing avenues of [private-prison] inmate relief might well frustrate a 
clearly expressed congressional policy”258 and would be 
“overreaching”259; this decision, courts have said, is “best left for 
Congress.”260  But perhaps these concerns are misplaced: it looks as 
though Congress has already recognized the Bivens remedy in some 
form.261  The Westfall Act, enacted in 1988, provides that the FTCA 
remedy, as well as the possibility of administrative adjustment of claims, 
 
 253.  Reinert, supra note 54, at 837, 838 fig.1 (raw success rates for Bivens suits in a survey of 
five districts is sixteen percent); id. at 827–32 (summarizing flawed conventional wisdom that most 
Bivens suits are meritless). 
 254.  Id. at 813, 843–44.  But see Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 
64 MO. L. REV. 123, 136 n.65, 145 n.109 (1999) (arguing the contrary, but only based on reported 
cases), cited in Reinert, supra note 54, at 813 n.16; id. at 844 (suggesting that perhaps qualified 
immunity plays a role in the selection of which cases to file); Pillard, supra note 54, at 80 
(“Qualified immunity is undoubtedly the most significant bar to constitutional tort actions.”).  
 255.  Reinert, supra note 54, at 851 (arguing that the high rates of plaintiff success in Bivens 
cases “do not support the view that a system of formal governmental liability would better serve the 
interests of deterrence or full compensation”); id. at 849 (suggesting “a hybrid form of liability,” 
where liability would be individual but the defendant could join the federal government if he could 
show that he was carrying out government policy). 
 256.  See supra text accompanying note 246. 
 257.  Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 289 (4th Cir. 2006).  
 258.  Id. at 290. 
 259.  Id. at 295. 
 260.  Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1103 (10th Cir. 2005), rev’d by an 
evenly divided en banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006); see also Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 
537, 562 (2007) (“[A]ny damages remedy for actions by Government employees who push too hard 
for the Government’s benefit may come better, if at all, through legislation.”); Pfander & Baltmanis, 
supra note 68, at 136 (“[T]he Court should simply recognize that Congress has presumed the 
availability of suits against federal officials for constitutional violations and has foreclosed all 
alternative remedies. . . . [T]he Court should no longer consider the possible existence of state 
common law remedies as a reason to proceed cautiously.”). 
 261.  Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 68, at 132–38; Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 50. 
33
Volokh: The Modest Effect of Minneci
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 1 - VOLOKH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:21 AM 
320 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:287 
“is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages 
by reason of the same subject matter” against the relevant employee,262 
but that this preclusion of other damages actions doesn’t apply to civil 
actions against government employees for constitutional violations.263  
Congress assumed that civil actions against government employees for 
constitutional violations exist; therefore, they must exist.264 
But this reasoning still doesn’t tell us how far the Bivens remedy 
should extend.  After all, some of the retrenchment of Bivens in light of 
alternative remedies, including Bush v. Lucas265 and Schweiker v. 
Chilicky,266 had already taken place by the time the Westfall Act was 
passed.  Should Bivens exactly track what the Supreme Court had held 
by 1988?  Or should the Westfall Act instead be read, like the antitrust 
statutes,267 as a delegation to the judiciary to continually develop 
standards for Bivens actions—or perhaps, less ambitiously, just as a 
recognition that the Supreme Court was in the process of doing so? 
B. Two Parallelisms 
Perhaps the best arguments for the optimal scope of Bivens are 
practical ones.  If only to avoid “incongru[ity] and confusi[on],”268 it 
seems attractive to maintain the “traditional parallelism”269 with § 1983 
actions,270 where state law is mostly irrelevant271 and alternative 
Congressional remedies can only override § 1983, if at all, to the extent 
 
 262.  28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (West 2013), added by Pub. L. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563 
(1988). 
 263.  Id. § 2679(b)(2)(A); see also H. Allen Black, Note, Balance, Band-Aid, or Tourniquet: 
The Illusion of Qualified Immunity for Federal Officials, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 733, 771–73 
(1991) (arguing that the Westfall Act should have swept more broadly and exempted federal 
officials from constitutional tort liability as well). 
 264.  For those who like legislative history, see also the legislative materials cited in Carlson v. 
Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19–20 (1980). 
 265.  462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 266.  487 U.S. 412 (1988).  Schweiker preceded the Westfall Act by about five months. 
 267.  See Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62 
TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1988) (characterizing the view that the antitrust states are “a standardless 
delegation to the federal courts to make national competition policy” as the “prevailing” view); id. 
at 1219–35 (laying out an alternative view, more grounded in the statutes themselves). 
 268.  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499 (1978) (quoting Economou v. USDA, 535 F.2d 
688, 695 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of 
Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972) (on remand))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 269.  Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 50. 
 270.  Pfander & Baltmanis, supra  note 68, at 139–41 (“With the recognition that Congress has 
confirmed the Bivens action in the Westfall Act, distinctions between the right to sue state and 
federal officials seem equally untenable.”); Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 50; Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 81–82 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 271.  See supra text accompanying notes 66–67.  
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they have been explicitly contemplated by Congress.272 
      This was basically the position taken in Carlson v. Green,273 where 
the Court held that Bivens was available for a federal public-prison 
inmate despite the availability of the FTCA.  The Court’s retreat from 
that part of the Carlson rationale is now quite complete, though other 
parts of the argument suggest that Carlson itself would come out the 
same way today: the Carlson Court’s rationale also included the view 
that FTCA suits aren’t a substitute for Bivens because they aren’t 
brought against individual officers. (This point only makes sense if we 
ignore the government’s ability to discipline its individual officers and 
assume that entity liability has no effect on individual deterrence.274  But 
such an assumption is probably wrong.275)  We might also buy Justice 
Powell’s argument that the FTCA remedy, because of all the 
exemptions, “simply is not an adequate remedy.”276 It’s thus a stretch to 
say that Carlson has been quietly overruled, but certainly not all of the 
reasoning holds up well today in light of current doctrine. 
Adopting a § 1983-like structure and mostly ignoring alternative 
remedies would also have the virtue of avoiding contingent debates 
about whether particular remedies at a particular time are adequate, 
leaving the choice of remedies instead to the litigant.277  There are many 
reasons—some good, some not so good—for preferring Bivens to state 
law.  Maybe litigants (like John Malesko) sometimes choose Bivens 
because they don’t know any better.278  Or they may prefer to be in 
federal court.  Or they may want a forum where they can litigate a 
specifically constitutional value,279 or they may want to avoid the 
 
 272.  See supra text accompanying note 68. 
 273.  446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 274.  See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21 (“Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against 
individuals, it is a more effective deterrent than the FTCA remedy against the United States.”); 
FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994) (if agencies could be sued under Bivens, plaintiffs would 
always sue agencies instead of individuals, and “the deterrent effects of the Bivens remedy would be 
lost”); Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70–71 (discouraging corporate harms “has no relevance to Bivens, 
which is concerned solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers”).  Cf. also 
supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing indemnification). 
 275.  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 44–45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that “other sanctions on 
employees—such as a threat of deductions in pay, reprimand, suspension, or firing”—may be 
effective “in promoting the desired level of deterrence”).  But see Richardson v. McKnight, 521 
U.S. 399, 410–11 (1997) (suggesting that civil service rules make disciplining public employees 
difficult).  But see on the other hand Rosenthal, supra note 54, at 820 (arguing that Richardson was 
wrong on this point). 
 276.  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 28 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 277.  Erwin Chemerinsky has taken a similar position.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity 
Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 300–26 (1988). 
 278.  Malesko, 534 U.S. at 80 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 279.  See infra Part VI.D. 
35
Volokh: The Modest Effect of Minneci
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 1 - VOLOKH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:21 AM 
322 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:287 
various state-law limitations I’ve discussed earlier.280  Allowing the 
litigant to choose frees judges and scholars from having to decide which 
system is more adequate. 
But maintaining the other big parallelism—that between the public 
and private sectors281—is tougher.  The Malesko Court noted the desire 
to maintain such parallelism as a reason against recognizing entity 
liability under Bivens: federal public prisoners can’t sue the BOP 
because of sovereign immunity, so neither should federal private 
prisoners be able to sue the private prison firm.282  Perhaps.  But the 
Court has already given up on the desire to maintain public-private 
parallelism: in the § 1983 context, Richardson v. McKnight283 denied 
private prison guards the qualified immunity enjoyed by public guards.  
Exceptions then built upon exceptions: when a case like Minneci came 
up in the Fourth Circuit, Judge Wilkinson—assuming that private 
qualified immunity would likewise be absent under Bivens—used this as 
an argument against extending Bivens.284 
More fundamentally, talk about public-private parallelism is 
somewhat ambiguous, because the public and private sectors work 
differently as an empirical matter.  Without rehashing the private prisons 
debate,285 suffice it to say that cost-cutting incentives are strong in the 
private sector and weak in the public sector, the effectiveness of 
monitoring can be expected to differ as between the sectors, the presence 
of competition is different, and so on.286  Moreover, as this Article has  
 
 
 280.  See supra text accompanying note 172. 
 281.  Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 50; Sarro v. Cornell Corr., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 52, 63 
(D.R.I. 2003); Purkey v. CCA Detention Ctr., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1150 (D. Kan. 2004); Peoples 
v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Sarro), rev’d by an evenly 
divided en banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006); id. at 1110–11 (Ebel, J., concurring and 
dissenting).  But see id. at 1103 (majority opinion) (“This asymmetry, however, existed prior to 
today’s holding; it was not created by this decision.  An implied right, by definition, is created by 
the courts and therefore cannot exist until it is judicially announced.”). 
 282.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72 (2001); see also Peoples v. CCA 
Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 2005) (Ebel, J., concurring and dissenting) 
(arguing that state-federal and public-private parallelism were hard to achieve simultaneously in 
Malesko but would be easy to achieve in the individual private officer case by recognizing the 
Bivens remedy), rev’d by an evenly divided en banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 283.  521 U.S. 399 (1997). 
 284.  Holly v. Scott, 434 F.3d 287, 294 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 285.  See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks: The Case of Prisons, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 128, 129 (Jody 
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (“Isn’t everything to be said on [private prisons] already in 
print?”). 
 286.  See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 57, at 1868–91. 
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taken pains to show, the background legal regime of the public and 
private sectors is massively different.  Any given legal regime, such as 
qualified immunity287 or Bivens will, accordingly, function differently in 
the public and private sectors; perhaps it will be necessary in one sector 
and not in the other.  We can maintain parallelism of formal Bivens 
remedies and end up with a more effective regime in one sector than in 
another.  Or we can seek equal levels of accountability, a different form 
of “parallelism,” which will require us to vary the availability of Bivens. 
Bring in the decisions of the government actors who decide whether 
to privatize, and the analysis becomes harder still.  Suppose, as the 
Richardson majority suggested, the private sector is more responsive to 
liability because of the greater flexibility of private business.288  We thus 
impose greater liability on the private sector—not because the private 
sector does worse, but because liability can do greater good there.  It 
could even be (hypothetically) that liability does such a great job in the 
private sector that quality is substantially better there than in the public 
sector, where incentives are more sluggish.  The result, however, will be 
that private prisons become more expensive relative to public ones.  
How will this affect the choice to privatize?  If privatization is driven by 
an overall cost-benefit analysis, the private sector might be chosen 
despite its higher cost.  But if, as Justice Scalia suggests in his 
Richardson dissent,289 privatization is primarily driven by cost-saving 
considerations, the system will wrongly choose the public provider even 
though the private system has higher quality.  There’s thus a potential 
tradeoff between two kinds of efficiency—efficiency in service 
provision (which might require more liability) and efficiency in provider 
selection (which might require less liability).290 
This was a hypothetical, of course.  Many believe that private 
prisons are worse than public prisons because of harmful cost-cutting  
incentives;291 for these people, liability is necessary because private 
 
 287.  See, e.g., Clayton Gillette & Paul Stephan, Richardson v. McKnight and the Scope of 
Immunity after Privatization, 1 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (2000). 
 288.  Richardson, 521 U.S. at 409–11. 
 289.  Id. at 418–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 290.  This flavor of tradeoff is familiar in many areas, for instance antitrust, regulated 
industries, and intellectual property, where allocative efficiency requires marginal-cost pricing 
while productive efficiency requires that producers be allowed to make sufficient profits to make 
production worthwhile.  See, e.g., W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND 
ANTITRUST 408–23 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing how to manage the tradeoff between marginal cost 
pricing and cost recovery); id. at 865–81 (discussing the same problem with patents). 
 291.  See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 55; McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 424–25 (6th Cir. 
1996).  But see Richardson, 521 U.S. at 421–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that this theory is 
implausible and noting that the Supreme Court majority didn’t adopt it). 
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prisons are worse, and so the greater expense of private prisons under 
Bivens correctly reflects private prisons’ worse performance.  My point 
here is merely that the relative quality of public vs. private prisons is an 
intensely empirical debate, one that’s unfortunately conducted without a 
lot of good data; and the debate over proper remedies should be 
conducted with this in mind. 
Why not simply follow the approach I endorsed above for federal-
state parallelism?  Why not allow more remedies rather than fewer, 
avoiding contingent debates about the effectiveness of public vs. private, 
and leaving the choice of remedies to the litigant?292  Because increasing 
the cost of state vs. federal incarceration is unlikely to alter the 
allocation of state vs. federal criminal work, either for better or for 
worse, so the tradeoff between efficiency in service provision and 
efficiency in provider selection is unlikely to arise.  It’s not logically 
impossible that voters would support more aggressive federal law 
enforcement and less aggressive state law enforcement when state 
incarceration becomes more expensive, but the prospect seems 
somewhat remote to me.  I don’t think the same can be said about 
increasing the cost of public vs. private incarceration, where cost 
considerations are very salient. 
In short, I’m sympathetic to a robust Bivens doctrine that basically 
tracks § 1983, but it doesn’t follow that there should be public-private 
parallelism in either Bivens or § 1983.  Perhaps those who feel that 
private prisons are a blight on the criminal justice system293 should favor 
even stricter remedies for the private sector; I myself think private 
prisons haven’t lived up to their boosters’ expectations, but neither have 
they been a humanitarian disaster as compared to public prisons.294  I 
generally favor robust accountability regimes and am sympathetic to the 
idea of liability in the prison context, if only to alleviate private prisons’  
legitimacy deficit in the public mind, but I do recognize the importance 
of evaluating whatever accountability mechanisms already exist in 
deciding whether more are needed.  In light of all this, it’s possible that 
Minneci might have been wrongly decided as a matter of Bivens 
 
 292.  See supra text accompanying note 277. 
 293.  See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 55. 
 294.  See GERALD G. GAES, THE CURRENT STATUS OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION RESEARCH ON 
AMERICAN PRISONS 9–12 (Aug. 2010), available at http://works.bepress.com/gerald_gaes/1/ (no 
strong conclusions to be drawn about recidivism resulting from incarceration in public vs. private 
prisons); id. at 26 (giving examples of rigorous public-private quality comparisons); id. at 32 (public 
and private sector “seem to have equal performance” where quality is concerned, though author 
himself isn’t convinced by this because of “lack of quality assessment and weak methodology” of 
comparisons). 
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doctrine, but it was certainly non-crazy.295 
C. No Doomsday 
Moreover, even if Minneci was wrongly decided, doomsday 
scenarios about its effect on prisoner rights seem unlikely to materialize. 
I doubt that Minneci will “permit a Bivens cause of action to be 
contracted away by federal entities who outsource their responsibilities 
to private corporations.”296 Well, more precisely, Bivens itself can be 
contracted away, as Minneci shows, but that’s not the same as 
contracting away accountability.  Unless actual, bottom-line 
accountability is harmed in this way, it’s hard to argue that Minneci will 
lead to a harmful slippery slope.  It’s true that privatization has the 
potential to mute constitutional accountability and reduce, or even 
eliminate, liability.297  But in the prison context, constitutional 
accountability hasn’t suffered.298  First, West v. Atkins299 made it clear 
that private doctors providing health-care services at public prisons are 
state actors.  Next, Richardson v. McKnight,300 assuming that private 
prisons are state actors,301 denied qualified immunity to private 
correctional officers (though it left open the possibility of a good-faith  
defense).302  And now, Minneci has denied Bivens remedies in a 
 
 295.  John Preis has raised objections to having available state-law actions be a bar to Bivens in 
a case-by-case way, because a Bivens remedy would be approved or denied at the start of litigation, 
when it might be unclear whether the conduct complained of would fit within tort law.  Preis, supra 
note 44, at 727, 749–58.  But the Minneci Court’s solution avoids these specific problems, since the 
inquiry into whether state law is adequate isn’t case-by-case but rather in bulk, looking into whether 
state law provides roughly comparable remedies over the broad run of cases. 
  The new state-law focus could also have some marginal effect in helping to validate 
“converse-1983 actions,” hypothetical state statutes subjecting federal actors violating the 
constitution to liability under state law.  See John F. Preis, The False Promise of the Converse-1983 
Action, 87 IND. L.J. 1697, 1719–20 (2012). 
 296.  Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 50, at 20. 
 297.  See Gillian Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003). 
 298.  Though other, non-constitutional, forms of accountability have indeed decreased as a 
result of privatization.  See, e.g., Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in 
Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L 
REFORM 249, 301–02 (1995). 
 299.  487 U.S. 42 (1988). 
 300.  521 U.S. 399 (1997). 
 301.  Correctly: see supra text accompanying note 55. 
 302.  Richardson, 521 U.S. at 401.  The Richardson Court also left open, among other issues, 
whether “a private individual briefly associated with a government body” could get qualified 
immunity.  Id. at 413.  In Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657 (2012), the Court held that a private 
attorney hired by a city to do a particular job could get qualified immunity, explaining that 
Richardson’s holding was dictated by the specific incentives characteristic of the private-prison 
market.  Id. at 1667. 
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(substantial303) range of private-prison Eighth Amendment cases, but 
only because of the broad overlap with and relative attractiveness of 
state-law remedies.304 
Moreover, the Minneci Court left open the possibility that Bivens 
might survive in other Eighth Amendment cases with no clear tort-law 
analogues,305 as, I suppose, in other constitutional areas without tort-law 
analogues like due process or equal protection or the limited prisoner 
rights that exist under the Fourth Amendment.306  (Not that these non-
Eighth-Amendment areas necessarily lack a tort analogue: a due process 
claim stemming from, say, having one’s phone calls with one’s attorney 
monitored, which happened to Cornelius Peoples, could, at least in 
Kansas, give rise to an “intrusion upon seclusion” claim.307) 
The Ninth Circuit panel that the Minneci Court reversed suggested 
a few such cases: the wanton deprivation of a toilet, personal hygiene 
items, or physical exercise—or perhaps prolonged exposure to human 
waste—might rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation but 
might not fit within the Restatement’s focus on physical harm.308  Some 
of Wesley Purkey’s claims against his private jailors were also of this 
sort.  For instance, his claims that he was subject to disciplinary action  
because he filed grievances and helped other inmates do the same309 
might not have been tortious—even though others, like destruction of 
papers, unsafe shower conditions, and excessive use of force,310 could fit 
comfortably into a tort framework.  Same with Hawa Abdi Jama and 
Samson Brown’s claims against the Esmor guards at their INS detention 
facility: torture, beating, and inadequate medical treatment can fit within 
 
 303.  See Schlanger, supra note 51, at 1571 & n.48 (noting that assaults and medical care 
account for a substantial portion of inmate litigation, with due process litigation over disciplinary 
sanctions and more general living-conditions claims also accounting for a substantial portion). 
 304.  Admittedly, even though this is a roughly equivalent level of accountability, one could 
argue over whether it’s constitutional accountability.  Maybe not; see infra Part VI.D. 
 305.  See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 625–26 (2012). 
 306.  See Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 50, at 30 n.169; Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 
U.S. 61, 80 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  As to the Fourth Amendment, inmates’ rights are quite 
limited, given the needs of prison security; for instance, an inmate has no “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” in his prison cell.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525–26 (1984).  But inmates may 
still retain Fourth Amendment rights against, for instance, body searches.  See, e.g., Sanchez v. 
Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 42 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 307.  Peoples v. CCA Detention Ctrs., 422 F.3d 1090, 1107–08 (10th Cir. 2005), rev’d by an 
evenly divided en banc court, 449 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 308.  Pollard v. GEO Group, Inc., 629 F.3d 843, 864 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing DeSpain v. Uphoff, 
264 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 2001); Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); 
Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Preis, supra note 44, at 753. 
 309.  Purkey v. CCA Detention Ctr., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1152–53, 1154–55 (D. Kan. 2004). 
 310.  Id. at 1151–52, 1153–54, 1155. 
40
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss2/1
ARTICLE 1 - VOLOKH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:21 AM 
2013] THE MODEST EFFECT OF MINNECI 327 
tort law; inadequate sanitation and exercise, maybe not.311  Judge Ebel’s 
partial dissent in Cornelius Peoples’s case suggests other possibilities: 
perhaps monitoring attorney calls intrudes upon seclusion, but what if 
the prison had merely insisted on having a guard and court reporter in 
the room when Peoples met with his lawyer?312 
Perhaps Bivens might even survive in a state that at some point 
lacks meaningful tort protections for private prisoner plaintiffs, though 
unfortunately Minneci isn’t clear on this.313 
D. The Receding Value of Vindication 
One can still complain that the labeling matters, and that replacing a 
constitutional suit with a state-law tort suit doesn’t really “enforce the 
constitutional norm,” even if they’re equal with respect to compensation 
and deterrence.314  Perhaps importing tort rhetoric into the constitutional 
sphere has harmful effects, whether in the doctrinal sense (by importing 
doctrines of fault or cost-benefit analysis) or in a more expressive sense 
(by reconceptualizing the relationship between state and citizen).315  Or 
perhaps the issue is just that constitutional tort is a more effective tool  
against the grand scale of government.  “[A]ll causes of action for 
damages” are not “fungible units,” says the Ninth Circuit;316 or, as 
Bivens says, we can’t “treat the relationship between a citizen and a 
federal agent unconstitutionally exercising his authority as no different 
from the relationship between two private citizens”:317 
 
 311.  Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 346 (D.N.J. 2004). 
 312.  Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1113 (Ebel, J., concurring and dissenting).  Note that Judge Ebel 
may not be right that this hypothetical case wouldn’t be tortious.  According to the Second 
Restatement, intrusion upon seclusion can occur whenever “[o]ne . . . intentionally intrudes . . . 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns . . . if the intrusion would 
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1965).  
The reasonable offense prong suggests that possibly, given an inmate’s expectation of confidential 
communications with his attorney, even Judge Ebel’s hypothetical might be actionable. 
 313.  Alexander Reinert and Lumen Mulligan also point out, intriguingly, that firms operating 
federal prisons try to use the government contractor doctrine to avoid state-law liability.  These 
attempts have (rightly) failed, but to the extent they succeed, their preemption of state law would 
conceivably resurrect the Bivens action.  Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 50, at 33–34; see also 
supra text accompanying notes 179–180. 
 314.  Reinert & Mulligan, supra note 50, at 27 n.56; Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1109–11 (Ebel, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
 315.  Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. 
L.J. 1719, 1738–50 (1989). 
 316.  Peoples, 422 F.3d at 1109 (Ebel, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 317.  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391–92 
(1971). 
41
Volokh: The Modest Effect of Minneci
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
ARTICLE 1 - VOLOKH (DO NOT DELETE) 4/8/2013  10:21 AM 
328 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:287 
[P]ower, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is 
wrongfully used.  An agent acting—albeit unconstitutionally—in the 
name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm 
than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his 
own.318 
But if that’s the theory, the Supreme Court retreated from it long 
ago, having long recognized that alternative (federal) non-constitutional 
remedies are sufficient to bar the Bivens action.  Michael Wells argues 
that the modern cases have abandoned seeking vindication as a 
distinctive constitutional value; vindication is not served by merely 
providing adequate compensation and deterrence, but requires at least 
the opportunity to raise and obtain a ruling on one’s constitutional 
claim.319  To go that route here would require overruling Schweiker v. 
Chilicky,320 where the Social Security appeals process was held 
sufficient.  (In Bush v. Lucas,321 at least the claimant could raise a 
constitutional claim to show a violation of the civil-service statutes, so 
the decision there may be consistent with vindication.322) 
Minneci underscores, then, that constitutional vindication as a 
distinct value isn’t considered very important.  (Perhaps denying Bivens 
and relying on alternative, nonconstitutional, remedies can be seen as a 
limited way for the Court to exercise constitutional avoidance.)  I don’t 
take a position in this Article on whether vindication should be 
considered important; my point here is narrower, that at least 
compensation and deterrence values, which are also important, continue 
to be served. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I opened this Article with an allusion to the Supreme Court’s 
uneasy relationship with criminal defendants’ rights; Minneci can be 
easily read as fitting within a conservative anti-defendant tradition.  But, 
while the retrenchment of Bivens has often been a conservative project, 
the partisanship of that move can be overstated: only Justices Marshall 
 
 318.  Id. at 392; see also Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 
758 (2006); Christina Brooks Whitman, Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 686 (1997); Preis, supra note 44, at 750. 
 319.  Michael L. Wells, Reviving the Value of Vindication in Constitutional Tort Law (2012) 
(unpublished draft, manuscript) (on file with author). 
 320.  487 U.S. 412 (1988). 
 321.  462 U.S. 367 (1983). 
 322.  Wells, supra note 319. 
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and Blackmun dissented in Bush v. Lucas,323 Chappell v. Wallace324 was 
unanimous, and only Justices Ginsburg and Stevens dissented in Wilkie 
v. Robbins.325  This case likewise illustrates how the liberal-conservative 
divide doesn’t  govern every case: only Justice Ginsburg dissented 
here,326 even though Justice Breyer, who agreed with Justice Stevens’s 
critique of the state-law argument in Malesko,327 could have joined her, 
and new Justices Sotomayor and Kagan likewise joined the majority. 
It would be interesting to see how the law, or at least the dissent, 
would have been different if Justice Stevens were still around.  Justice 
Stevens might have continued to press his view that alternative remedies 
shouldn’t necessarily dispose of a Bivens claim,328 as well as his more 
general view that the Court needn’t be sparing with implied rights of 
action.329  But, for now, it seems that even the Court’s liberal wing is 
unwilling to take a strong stand on Bivens. 
Moreover, while the case might well have been wrongly decided, 
and while it presumptively disadvantages federal private prison litigants 
to some extent in that it removes a cause of action that they might have 
found attractive, it’s not a disaster for inmate rights.  Private-prison 
inmate litigation will continue in a different form and partly in different 
venues; the vagaries of state tort law will play a rejuvenated role; and 
these vagaries may, on balance, be quite positive. 
 
 
 323.  462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 324.  462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 325.  551 U.S. 537, 568 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 326.  132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 327.  Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.).  
 328.  See id. at 78–79.  But see Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 430 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the majority, and disagreeing 
with a dissent by Justice Brennan, that Bivens could be restricted where the Social Security appeals 
process was available). 
 329.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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